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WHY THE US MUST SHIFT ITS NORTH KOREA POLICY FROM DISARMAMENT TO DETERRENCE
After 11 September 2001, America's top priority shifted from selective engagement to defending the peace against its enemies, particularly terrorists and tyrants. In its 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), the Bush administration established a primary objective from which all other objectives seem to originate: Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and
Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction. 1 The Bush administration viewed North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program with increased scrutiny and began to question whether or not
Pyongyang could be deterred from taking unwanted actions. North Korea's recently disclosed nuclear weapons program, rampant proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles, hatred of the United States, disrespect for human values, and global sales of missile technology to terrorist groups and other rogue states has made it a high-level threat to the national security of the United
States and a subject of continuous of debate in Washington and among the media.
Because of the high risks of deterring rogue nations and non-state actors, the Bush Administration adopted a strategic objective of disarmament. The NSS implies that if diplomacy does not work in North Korea and Kim Jong Il does not disarm peacefully, he will be forcibly disarmed by the United States and a coalition of "the willing." But is North Korea really not deterrable or should the United States reevaluate its strategic objectives? Since North Korea sees the possession of both nuclear weapons and long-range missiles as key to its survival, it will not be deterred by the United States from developing more nuclear weapons or be compelled to disarm. Instead, the United States should shift its focus from forcible disarmament to deterring North Korea from using WMD to avoid becoming engulfed in a major war that it did not need to initiate.
The Case for Disarmament
It is understandable why the Bush administration and many others have decided to take the forcible disarmament approach. First, some supporters of preemption argue that allowing North
Korea to possess nuclear weapons will send a message that will undermine the continuing attempts to stem nonproliferation and lead Tokyo, Taiwan, and Seoul to seriously consider nuclearization and negate historical gains already won by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Second, by admitting that it had a nuclear weapons development program, they argue that Pyongyang is showing positive signs that it is finally willing to negotiate honestly and openly.
Third, disarmament supporters argue the preemption policy, combined with the war in Iraq, will create a sense of urgency among the regional powers, particularly China, to pressure North Korea toward denuclearization. Finally, they argue deterrence will not work against North Korea since threats have not convinced Kim Jong Il to stop reviving and expanding its nuclear weapons program.
With respect to undermining the NPT, the United States can alleviate the concerns of it allies in the region by declaring a strong and very clear weapons of mass destruction deterrence policy to
Pyongyang that delineates that any use of or sale of these weapons will open the regime to a devastating U.S. response. By declaring such a deterrence policy and continuing to maintain a nuclear umbrella over Japan and South Korea, the chances of any of these countries beginning a nuclear weapons program becomes unlikely.
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The next arguments are valid, but they ignore the historical track record of North Korea.
Granted, Pyongyang has shown signs of opening up by disclosing its nuclear weapons program. In addition, the targeting of nuclear reactors carries a risk due to their unknown status.
Radioactive fallout from the bombing of these reactors could cover the population centers in North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, and Taiwan. 
Deterrence Will Work
Although North Korea's nuclear advancement, biological weapons capability, and history of providing weapons to rogue states can be seen as more threatening than anything Saddam has today, the Bush administration chose to preempt Iraq mainly because it still has options to prevent 9 Michael McDevitt, The Post-Korean Unification Security Landscape and U.S. Security Policy in Northeast Asia," in Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J Ellings, eds., Korea's Future and the Great Powers, Chapter 9, 260. Iraq from doing the same thing that North Korea presumably has already done -develop WMD and the delivery systems by which it can attack its neighbors and the United States. As enumerated in the prior section, the ways and means to attain a goal of disarmament are not available. North Korea will not be deterred from developing weapons it perceives as essential to remaining in power. Kim Jong Il places supreme importance on preventing the United States from interfering in North Korean actions on the peninsula or eliminating his regime. Consequently, a nuclear North Korea is the price we pay for continuing to make deals with a country that doesn't seem capable of sticking to its side of the bargain. Now that a nuclear North Korea is reality, the Bush administration must establish a clear, declaratory nuclear deterrence policy for North Korea. Of course, the United States continues to have the capability to deter North Korea from attacking and, along with South Korea, has successfully deterred it from attacking south for more than 50 years. However, the clarity and credibility of the U.S.'s deterrence policy and the character, calculation, and cultural influences of Kim Jong Il in today's uncertain global security environment today will ultimately determine North Korea's susceptibility to deterrence.
If these factors were examined, the administration could better anticipate Kim Jong Il's likely response to U.S. deterrence threats and develop a deterrence policy tailored specifically to the unique conditions associated with North Korea. Deterrence expert and Georgetown University professor Keith Payne developed a framework that can be used as a basis for such an examination.
13 Before identifying deterrence options and developing policy, this framework can be used to take into consideration:
1. Objectives and actions to be deterred 2. Factors that affect decision-making 3. Adversary's susceptibility to U.S. policies (credibility x intent) and vice versa 4. A strategic profile with respect to current situation
The primary U.S. objective is to prevent North Korea from resolving any crisis by force, deter it from proliferation, and preserve U.S. freedom of action in the region. This includes deterring an invasion of Seoul, a ballistic missile attack against U.S. and its allies, a nuclear strike against United States, Japan or South Korea, and the sale of WMD to a third party.
North Korea's immediate objective is regime survival with the secondary objective of preventing economic collapse. In the mind of the Kim Jong Il, ownership of nuclear weapons limits the freedom in which his enemies can engage him. North Korean leadership has a high level of determination and commitment to develop WMD because vulnerability could lead to U.S.
attack and certain defeat. The possession of WMD also provides a great bargaining chip in negotiations for the aid upon which the country so desperately depends. The only declared U.S. nuclear policy for North Korea is the failed Agreed Framework.
Although the preemptive provisions of the NSS imply that the United States should be threatening
North Korea with the same fate as Iraq, the Bush administration has signaled that it will not use force. The key to establishing a credible deterrence policy is to determine the level of risks North Korea's leadership is willing to take and the level of credibility of U.S. deterrence in the mind of these leaders.
North Korea has made several attempts to deter the United States from interfering with its nuclear weapons development on the peninsula. For example, it has warned that sanctions are an act of war and is currently threatening to convert fuel rods into plutonium for nuclear weapons. Pyongyang has violated numerous agreements and recurrently makes dangerous threats, it has a tendency to comply when necessary. With his country's deteriorating economy, Kim Jong Il realizes further provocation could lead to fatal and political losses for his regime. Therefore, he is probably keenly aware that a North Korean attack would be the end of his regime and cause massive costs to his country. This seems to make a very strong case for a deterrable North Korea.
A Rogue In A Class By Itself
Based on the above examination, North Korea has rationale leaders that are calculating and are willing to take medium risks associated with developing nuclear weapons in order to survive.
Then again, Pyongyang views the U.S. nuclear deterrence as very credible and is very aware of and understands the risks and costs of launching an attack against its neighbors or the United
States. Despite NSS generalities that deterrence is less likely to work against rogue nations, North Korea's leadership can be deterred. Consequently, the United States should establish a nuclear deterrence policy for North Korea that will clearly communicate and that threatens nuclear retaliation in response to an invasion of Seoul, WMD attack against the United States or its allies, or sale to a third party. Do we want to forcibly disarm North Korea, quite possibly at the risk of losing many lives, if there is a high probability that deterrence will work? Given that South Korea and Japan are willing to accept the risks of a nuclear North Korea and entrust its security in the power of U.S. deterrence, definitely not.
